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Commentary on “Blind Spots, Moral Hazards & Wounded Narratives”: 
What We Don’t Know 
 
CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE  
Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric  







G. Thomas Goodnight’s venture into agnotology, which is likely to “become a growing part of 
our discipline,” is far-ranging in its suggestiveness and exposes problems that ignorance poses 
for argumentation theory in particularly vivid ways. 
 The thrust of the paper is really to identify and describe the four thought styles involving 
ignorance, that he identifies as blind spots, moral hazards, wounded narratives, and 
aggressiveness. This exploration issues in two related claims: about dissensus (that expression of 
difference in alternatives) generating “arcs of emancipatory release from the false typology that 
deems the act of arguing as revealing an agreeable or disagreeable character”; and dissensus 
appearing “as an emancipatory project for the field of argument studies.” He leaves open the 
question whether ignorance can be routinely “anticipated, recognized, and corrected in each of 
these cases” (p. 4). 
 In these comments, I will focus on the account of blind spots (since the presentation has 
been largely limited to this) and consider the value of emancipatory argument, while also 
offering some comments on the other kinds of ignorance. 
 
2. Of ignorance 
 
As noted, prior to the emergence of Proctor’s work on agnotology, argumentation theorists’ 
principal exposure to the nature of ignorance was via discussions of the ad ignorantiam, 
generally judged as fallacious reasoning. That is how it is presented by Goodnight, who defines 
it in terms expressed by informal logicians as the fallacy “that a proposition is true simply on the 
basis that it has not been proved false or that it is false simply because it has not been proved 
true” (p. 3). As he himself notes, this is a bit of an overstatement, or at least, the term ‘fallacy’ is 
overused. The scheme of reasoning involved often issues in reasonable conclusions when 
appropriately employed in law or science, for example. What matters is whether there is a 
concerted effort to confirm or disconfirm the claim in question. Where arguers simply take the 
absence of evidence for or against a claim, without further investigation, as conclusive, then we 
have a fallacy. 
 The kind of not-knowing involved here needs to be considered, because I take not-
knowing to be at the heart of ignorance, and we will want to consider this in relation to the other 
kinds of ignorance identified in Goodnight’s treatment, these four generic forms that capture the 
ad ignorantiam as a thought style. Under the terms of the fallacy of ad ignorantiam, the 
ignorance is willful. It involves a refusal to assume one’s epistemological obligation and 
investigate sufficiently. Since a conclusion is drawn on inadequate evidence of the right kind, 
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then the failure would be one of sufficiency. The ignorance is assumed and may have no relation 
in reality. That is, it is different from more substantial kinds of ignorance that can bear on a 
person’s argumentation. 
 To take two examples,1 as a decision maker I deliberate about the future, but there are 
relevant features of that future that are unknown. This is a kind of not-knowing that I strive to 
anticipate in my reasoning, drawing analogies with past experience. But my conclusions in 
relation to it are always defeasible. Only future events will transform that ignorance into 
knowledge against which the quality of my anticipatory reasoning can be judged. A second kind 
of ignorance is more immediate (and perhaps more interesting insofar as it has relevance to the 
discussion of blind spots). As paradoxical as this will sound, there are things I know of which I 
am ignorant. That is, I am not aware of what I know. I am not aware of this in part because, as 
Goodnight points out in reference to Vico, “human cognitive resources [are] limited and the 
stresses of expression exacting” (p. 8). The cognitive field that I share with others is cluttered 
with ideas, beliefs, and assumptions. I cannot possibly be aware of all of this all the time. Just as 
my visual field involves things that are unseen (because they are never attended to), so my 
cognitive field involves things that are there, available to me, but of which I remain essentially 
ignorant. The right kind of argument can modify my cognitive field so as to reveal such things 
and make them knowable. Here, there is no willfulness involved in the ignorance. It is simply a 
matter—on Vico’s terms—of being constrained by the limits of human cognition. It is this kind 
of ignorance that might be most readily resolved by the argumentation of an arguer who knows 
what is unknown to her audience while at the same time knowable. 
 
3. Blind spots  
 
Blind spots are “an active genre where ignorance moves from accidental qualities to discovery” 
(p. 7).  All human beings carry such “places where inconsistencies are yet to be connected up, 
gaps filled, or accounting taken” (p. 8). Our failure to see what is seeable from a different 
perspective is a failure of communicative argument. We must come to grips with what William 
James calls “the significance of alien lives” (p. 8). 
 In this, James is identifying a blindness with regard to the feelings of other people (other 
lives). There is indeed an ignorance here, but it seems a shift from what we considered under the 
label of the ad ignorantiam. There, the problem lies with the advancing of a claim on the basis of 
insufficient evidence for or against it, taking the absence of evidence as proof. Here, the 
ignorance derives from a narrowness of perspective, one that may be almost unavoidable given 
that this is something that afflicts us all. (We are back, it seems, in the problems of other minds 
that Goodnight addressed in his OSSA keynote a few years ago). So not only are we dealing with 
a different genre of ignorance; we seem to be dealing with different kinds, such that there may be 
little of insight that can be transferred from one kind to another. 
 Still, blind spots involve ignorance. On the terms suggested by James (and Vico), we are 
ignorant of the alien lives with whom we strive to communicate. In a more expansive sense, 
blind spots occur when things “taken-for-granted to be true (with no accessible or experienced 
disproof), are in fact false”, or “things taken-for-granted to be false (with no accessible of 
experienced positive proof) are in fact true” (p. 9). This does try to connect the idea to the ad 
ignorantiam after all. The “blindness” is again a failure to investigate. And blind spots also arise 
from a simple narrowness of vision, where we fail to see what else is present because we are 
                                                     
1 And I benefit here from Blake Scott’s analyses, provided elsewhere in these Proceedings. 
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fixated on a certain course or task. To advance the metaphor, we become myopic. Here, we are 
ignorant of what is there, available to us should we only train ourselves to look (or have an 
interlocutor draw it to our attention), or broaden our vision. While this may also be something 
that afflicts us all, it is not the problem of inaccessible truths, locked in alien lives; it is the 
ignorance of ignoring. 
 On my reading, then, one type of ignorance connected with blind spots involves other 
people and the necessary unknowing associated with their inner lives. This can only be addressed 
through argumentation that is informed by the different identities people possess. It is audience-
focussed, and in this respect rhetoric offers a range of valuable tools to assist us. 
 A second type of ignorance connected with blind spots involves our own ideas, beliefs 
and commitments, and the gaps between them. While we are not automata, nor are we possessed 
of consistent belief sets. Our belief sets overlap in the cognitive environment and are constantly 
being challenged there. This is where ignorance comes in. We do not always know what we 
believe in the sense of our commitments. We do not always see the implications of the 
commitments we hold. 
 
4. The cognitive environment 
 
Cognitive environments or fields are shared “spaces” where ideas, beliefs, commitments and 
values can be identified because they are current in those spaces. While we cannot know what 
those “alien lives” know, we can reasonably infer what they should know given the 
environments in which they live. Using the analogy with visual fields, we can appreciate that just 
as visual fields will overlap so that there is common content, so our cognitive fields will overlap. 
And just as there are many things in a person’s visual field which go unnoticed, so there are 
many things in one’s cognitive environment that, necessarily, go unnoticed, perhaps because 
they are not salient to a project or train of thinking, or because the connections between ideas 
have not been seen. Thus, the cognitive environments include elements of what is unknown, 
about which people are ignorant.  
 Argumentation can address an individual personally, a known interlocutor can be 
approached through mutually agreed starting points relevant to all parties because their beliefs 
are known to each other. But argumentation also (and perhaps primarily) works by modifying 
cognitive environments. This can be done in a range of ways: by introducing new ideas into an 
environment; by emphasizing—and thus making present—what is there, perhaps by making 
connections between ideas; or by challenging what is there with a view to eliminating it from the 
environment. 
 In at least the second way, blind spots are taken as problematic in some sense and are 
explicitly addressed by making known what is available to us but what we were ignorant about. 
By understanding what is present in a person’s or community’s mutual cognitive environment, 
the arguer is able to identify important or relevant blind spots and attempt to remedy the situation 
by presenting reasons that reveal the points of ignorance transforming them from knowable to 
known. Of course, such a move does not render them accepted; that is a task for persuasive 
argumentation. But this work in the cognitive environment that makes present what is knowable 
there can be judged as a necessary pre-argumentative step, creating the conditions for successful 
argumentation to ensue.  
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5. Other types of ignorance 
 
I want to offer a few remarks about the other genres of ignorance addressed in Professor 
Goodnight’s paper.  
 The first of these is identified as “moral hazards,” or acquiescing without testing. These 
occur when the incentives to remain silent override the rewards of pursuing accurate or truthful 
argument: “the incentives for agreeing with a false proposition, asserted to be true, are so high 
that disagreement is out of the question…In such a situation, there is no proof necessary for the 
value of a proposition because disagreement is nullified” (p. 10). Here disagreement is ruled out 
in advance. But then, is this strictly speaking an instance of ignorance? Things that should be 
contested are not, but is there any important sense of not-knowing involved? I am not sure. The 
incentive to agree is a personal, pragmatic decision without clear epistemic expectation. Our 
lives are built on studied acquiescence to a range of authorities, from parents to teachers to 
community leaders. Only in instances where the circumstances warrant challenging the 
authority’s word would we begin to expect something other than acquiescence. Otherwise, what 
is at stake is trust, something without which we cannot function socially. The larger question 
suggested by Goodnight’s treatment of moral hazards is ‘when is trust warranted?’ We are in the 
realm of ethotic reasoning here, or as the informal logician might phrase it, the appropriateness 
of appealing to authorities. But here the clear connection to ignorance is lost. Granted, we are 
considering different ‘styles’ or genres of ignorance, but we still expect some underlying 
intensional definition that makes all of these genres related. 
 Wounded narratives (or building from unstable grounds) “are those that carry traces of 
incoherence over time that are erased by aesthetic interest. The argumentum ad ignorantiam 
contribution to this is a false attribution that the experiences of interlocutors permit direct 
exchange, or, that differences can be discounted or repaired to address a particular issue at hand” 
(p. 12). Perhaps we could consider this an extension of the discussion of alien lives, because 
alien past lives are even more difficult to access when we have no clear conception of the 
cognitive environments they inhabited. As I understand this genre, the unknown (the ignorance) 
lies in the assumptions around translation. It carries the problems associated with the evaluation 
of all historical arguments, where access to the intended audience is impossible or limited. I 
leave aside here those problems. 
 Finally, there is Aggressive Ignorance (connected with aggressive assertion). The case 
that illustrates this genre is that of the automated chat bot, TayandYou, and the bot Tay, designed 
by Microsoft. Hence, the discussion of automated argument. The designers did not anticipate the 
kind of interaction that would ensue. We learn something of “[w]hat happens when argument is 
automated, presence is distanced, and violations of politeness rules but a matter of programming 
meeting user and sales opportunities” (p. 14). But I am unsure both of the connections to 
ignorance here, or the extent to which we can generalize from this case.  It revolves around the 
cognitive environment of a particular audience—18 to 24-year-old Twitter users. And while 
there is a type of ignorance associated with their reaction, it once again does not seem cognitive 
in nature. 
 
6. Emancipatory argument 
 
The solution advanced to deal with these types of ignorance is named “emancipatory argument”. 
“[It] challenges taken-for-granted blind spots, moral hazards, wounded narratives, and aggressive 
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ignorance by inventing alternative positions that question prejudices, discover different ways of 
weighting the costs of agreeableness, draining and suturing wounded narratives, and blocking 
encouragements to indulge in automated and/or stimulated aggressive trolling” (p. 15). 
It strikes me that the real problem here for argumentation theory is that we build 
arguments on commonplaces. But several of the genre identified by Goodnight disclose an 
ignorance of any commonality. That is the gap that must be closed, the bridge crossed. Dissensus 
recognizes differences and builds on them in ways that encourage understanding. Grasping 
alternatives undermines the ignorance associated with narrow perspectives, forces us into a 
vision shared by others, opens our eyes to the wider terrains of the environments we share, and 
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